



From Kyoto to Quito: Reassessing oil moratorium as an effective climate change policy 





Leaving oil reserves unexploited in exchange for an economic compensation has been 
recently put forward as an innovative climate change policy. Some scholars have praised this 
idea for establishing the foundations of the “new economics of planet Earth” and for having the 
potential to become “a new paradigm for global conservation programs”.  This alternative was 
first proposed by Ecuador, where a third of the state’s resources depend on the exploitation of 
oil. In 2007, President Rafael Correa announced Ecuador’s decision not to exploit the ITT oil 
fields, one of the largest in the country and which overlaps the Yasuni National Park in the 
Amazon, in exchange for a “fair” compensation from the international community for at least 
half of the revenue that would have otherwise come from extracting the oil (namely $3.6 billion). 
Through the Yasuni-ITT Initiative, Ecuador purports to “lay the foundations for a more human 
and fair civilization”.3 
This paper argues, however, that forgoing a country’s oil reserves will be an ineffective 
climate change policy in the long-run. In fact, rather than announcing non-enforceable and short-
term political promises, states like Ecuador should move toward a system of “environmental 
property rights” that favor carbon sequestration.   
                                                            
1 The author wishes to thank Professor Carol M. Rose for her valuable comments and suggestions, and Jocelyn 
Stacey for her feedback. 
2 Master of Laws (LL.M.) Yale Law School (candidate June 2011). 
3 Speech of the President of the Republic of Ecuador, Mr Rafael Correa, on the High Level Dialogue on Climate 





In Part I, I provide an overall background on the creation and boundaries of the Yasuni 
National Park, the ITT oil reserves, and the territories of indigenous peoples. I then describe the 
main features of the Yasuni-ITT Initiative based on the agreements entered into between 
Ecuador and the United Nations last year, which set forth the creation of a trust fund to channel 
international contributions to the program. 
In Part II, I discuss the reasons supporting Ecuador’s claim as it was presented by Correa to 
the international community. In this Section, I also describe different climate-justice theories that 
have been offered to justify compensation from northern hemisphere to southern hemisphere 
countries. I focus particularly on the inconsistencies of the inter-state justice approach that 
justifies compensation based on developed nations’ historical emissions and ability to pay, which 
are is underlying justification of the Kyoto Protocol and other international environmental 
treaties to date. I conclude that Correa’s proposal is justifiable from a cosmopolitan justice 
standpoint. 
 In Part III, I criticize the Yasuni-ITT Initiative by stressing that a property-based approach 
would have reduced the likelihood that a post-Correa government would decide to disregard the 
oil moratorium in the future. My critique raises the following arguments: the initiative’s 
excessive focus on the oil and not on the trees; the fact that it does not create “environmental 
property rights”; the lack of institutional framework supporting the program; the lack of ripeness 
of the property rights regime in Ecuador; and the initiative’s potential to impinge on indigenous 
peoples’ free exercise of their ancestral territories. 
 Finally, in Part IV, I propose three alternatives to Correa’s model, namely (i) selling the oil 




over the national park. I conclude that the last of these alternatives is the most feasible option and 
should be taken into account in future climate change policymaking. 
 
I.  The Yasuni-ITT Initiative4 
1.  General background 
 The Yasuni National Park is located in the Amazon Region and is the largest protected area 
in Ecuador with 982,000 hectares. It was created in 1979 and is considered one of the most 
diverse areas in the world.5 In 1989, the Yasuni National Park was declared a World Biosphere 
Reserve by UNESCO for its unique biodiversity.6 Currently, the park is managed by the Ministry 
of Environment of Ecuador, an entity which faces limited budget and personnel.7 
                                                            
4 See generally Tracy C. Davis, Breaking Ground Without Lifting a Shovel: Ecuador’s Plan to Leave its Oil in the 
Ground, 30 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 243 (2008) (describing the initiative); Alexandra Valencia, Ecuador, for pay, will not 
drill in Amazon (Aug. 3, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6724S820100803 (last visited September 
21, 2010); Daniel Gordon, Ecuador seeks oil 'compensation' (Sep. 21, 2007), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7000345.stm (last visited September 21, 2010); The Yasuni-ITT Initiative Web 
Page, http://Yasuni-itt.gob.ec/; and SOS  YASUNI, http://www.sosYasuni.org/en/; Alberto Acosta et al., Dejar el 
crudo en tierra o la busqueda del paraiso perdido (May 2009), 
http://www.amazoniaporlavida.org/es/files/keep_oil_underground.pdf (last visited September 21, 2010); Alberto 
Acosta, Yasuni, Building the Road to the Impossible: 
Leaving the Crude Oil Underground, Presentation (University of Maryland, May 23, 2007),  
http://www.amazoniaporlavida.org/es/files/descargas/presentacion_itt_acosta_eng.ppt  (last visited September 21, 
2010); Alberto Acosta, La iniciativa Yasuni-ITT: En la busqueda del paraiso perdido, Presentation (Feb. 17, 2010), 
http://www.amazoniaporlavida.org/es/files/descargas/ITT-USFQ.pptx (last visited September 21, 2010); Alexandra 
Valencia, Ecuador, for pay, will not drill in Amazon (Aug. 3, 2010), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6724S820100803 (last visited September 21, 2010); Daniel Gordon, 
Ecuador seeks oil 'compensation', (Sep. 21, 2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7000345.stm (last visited 
September 21, 2010); http://Yasuni-itt.gob.ec/; http://www.amazoniaporlavida.org/; http://www.sosYasuni.org/en/; 
and OILWATCH, Keep the oil underground, the only way to fight climate change (2007), 
http://www.amazoniaporlavida.org/es/files/keep_oil_underground.pdf (last visited September 23, 2010). 
5 “An average upland hectare in Yasuni contains 655 species of trees (more than the United States and Canada 
combined) and 100,000 species of insects. One section of the park held at least 200 species of mammals, 247 
amphibians and reptile species, and 550 species of birds, making the park one of the most biodiverse places on 
Earth”. Kelly Hearn, Deep in Ecuador’s Rainforest, A Plan to Forego an Oil Bonanza (September 13, 2010), 
http://e360.yale.edu/feature/deep_in_ecuadors_rainforest_a_plan_to_forego_an_oil_bonanza/2315/ (last visited 
September 23, 2010). 
6 See UNESCO, http://www.unesco.org/mabdb/br/brdir/directory/biores.asp?code=ECU+02&mode=all (last visited 
September 23, 2010). 




The park hosts several indigenous people 
like the Huaorani, Tagaeri and Taromenane tribes. 
Studies indicate that almost 10,000 people inhabit 
the area.8 In 1999, the government declared 
780,000 hectares of the park an “intangible zone” 
in order to protect the Huaorani people (see Figure 
1).9  Although the government has officially 
recognized the Huaorani people’s right over a 
portion of this area, specific provisions stipulate 
that this ownership does not comprise the subsoil, which is state property. Accordingly, the 
Huaorani people are prohibited to impede or obstruct “mining or hydrocarbon exploration and/or 
exploitation activities undertaken by the national government and/or legally authorized 
individuals or companies”.10 
Currently, several oil companies already operate in certain blocks of the national park.11 
The Ishpingo Tambococha Tiputini (ITT) oil field is located in the heart of the park and is 
currently administered by the Ecuadorian state-owned company Petroecuador (see Figure 2). It 
contains 846 million barrels of heavy crude reserves that represent more than 20% of the total oil 
reserves of the country.12 Considering the high density of the crude, the project to exploit the 
                                                            
8 See Tracy C. Davis, supra note 4. 
9 See OILWATCH, supra note 4. 
10 OILWATCH, Conserving crude oil in the subsoil (April 12, 2007). 
http://www.sosyasuni.org/en/files/ow_itt_proposal_v8-ingles.pdf (last visited September 23, 2010). 
11 Tracy C. Davis, supra note 4. 
12 See Carlos Larrea, Conservation or oil extraction in Yasuni National Park? A transcendental challenge, 








reserves includes a thermoelectric plant, as well as an oil conversion plant to produce light oil 
and facilitate transportation.13 Oil exploration in ITT can only start in 5 years and will last 
approximately 13 years, producing 107,000 barrels a day. Experts claim that the exploitation of 
the ITT oil fields will generate significant negative social and environmental impacts to the 
park.14 
 
2.  The initiative 
Ecuador has announced its decision to 
give up the ITT oil reserves in order “to put 
social and environmental values first and to 
change the energy matrix of the country”.15 In 
exchange, Ecuador has asked the international 
community to compensate it for at least half of 
the revenue that would have otherwise come 
from extracting the oil, namely $3.6 billion 
over a 13-year period. 
After arduous domestic and international 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
http://www.amazoniaporlavida.org/es/files/descargas/modelo_cuantitativo_Yasuni_ITT_ingles.ppt (last visited 
September 21, 2010). 
13 See id. 
14 The following negative impacts have been identified: environmental impacts (pollution, deforestation, alteration 
of ecological relationships in ecosystems); economic impacts (loss of productivity of self-sustenance economies, 
high costs of security, maintenance, mediation and compensation); social impacts (general deterioration in the zone, 
alcoholism, violence, prostitution, disease, destruction of the social fabric); political impacts (increase in conflicts in 
the region, state abandonment, crossborder violence); and cultural impacts (cultural extinction). See generally 
Alberto Acosta et al., supra note 4. 








debate,16 in August 2010 the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the government 
of Ecuador agreed on the terms for the establishment of the Yasuni Trust Fund. The signature of 
the “Memorandum of Agreement for management and other support services related to the in 
Ecuador Yasuni-ITT Fund,” dated August 3, 2010 (MOA), and the “Ecuador Yasuni-ITT Fund 
Terms of Reference,” dated July 28, 2010 (TOR), marked two landmarks in the history of the 
Yasuni-ITT Initiative.17 The signature of these documents is said to have “the potential to 
become a paradigm for global rainforest conservation programs”.18 
The Yasuni Fund will be managed by the UNDP through a Steering Committee consisting 
of members of the UNDP and the government of Ecuador and will receive contributions from a 
broad range of donors.19 The funds raised will be used to finance strategic sustainable 
development programs as stated in the Ecuadorian national development plan guidelines.20 
As a guarantee for the contributions, the government will issue “Yasuni Guarantee 
Certificates” (CGYs) in US dollars equivalent to the face value of each contribution.21 The 
CGYs will also include the metric tons of carbon dioxide avoided according to the price, at that 
date, of the European Union Allowances (EUAs) in the Leipzig Carbon Market. They will not 
                                                            
16 “[T]he study of the Yasuni-ITT initiative and its global campaign is a lesson for academics and policymakers 
alike who are seeking innovative solutions to protect our most precious and vulnerable planetary areas”. Pamela L. 
Martin, Global Governance from the Amazon: Leaving Oil Underground in Yasuni National Park, Ecuador, Paper 
Presented at the 51st Convention of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, Louisiana (February 16, 
2010), http://www.sosyasuni.org/en/files/global_governance_from_the_amazon_pamela_martin_isa_2010.pdf 
(providing an interesting discussion on the social movements, both domestic and international, behind the 
elaboration of the Yasuni-ITT initiative). 
17 This paper is based on both official documents. See Yasuni-ITT Trust Fund Web Page, supra note 15.  
18 See Kelly Hearn, supra note 5. 
19 See id. at § 18. 
20 The main sources of contributions to the Yasuni Fund will be (i) contributions from governments, 
intergovernmental entities, non-governmental organizations, private foundations, private-sector organizations, and 
individuals; (ii) contributions from the public at large, through public fund-raising events following the prior 
approval of the Steering Committee; and, (iii) income from the sale of CGYs by the Government of Ecuador to 
private and public entities. See Trust Fund TOR at § 8. 
21 Those contributions below the minimum threshold to be established by the Steering Committee will be deemed as 




earn interest and will not have an expiration or maturity date. The maximum total number of 
CGYs issued will be equivalent to the value of a total of 407 million metric tons of carbon 
dioxide not emitted as a result of preserving the ITT oil reserves.22 
The MOA establishes that the contributions to the Yasuni Fund must reach a minimum 
threshold of $100 million by the end of 2011; otherwise, the contributions will be reimbursed to 
donors. The TOR provides that if in the future the world carbon market accepts the CGYs as 
equivalents of emission permits, the government will issue CGYs for sale to private or public 
entities in mitigating Green House Gases (GHG) through avoidance of oil and gas extractions 
from mega-biodiverse areas that are highly socially and environmentally sensitive.23 However, in 
the event that the government defaults on its commitment and decides to initiate oil prospecting 
in the Yasuni ITT oil fields, the CGYs will entitle the holders to be reimbursed by the 
government.24 
In general, the proposal is said to help abate climate change by avoiding the release into the 
atmosphere of 407 million tons of carbon dioxide as a consequence of burning the ITT oil 
reserves. It will also avoid biodiversity destruction and deforestation, protect fresh water from 
the possible oil operations in the area, respect the indigenous peoples’ rights, and initiate a post-
oil economy by changing the energy matrix of the country.25 
 To date the regional government of Wallonia (Belgium), Chile, China and Spain have 
contributed (or committed to contribute) to the Yasuni Fund.26 Surprisingly, shortly after the 
                                                            
22 See Trust Fund TOR at § 26-30. 
23 See id. at § 27. 
24 See id. 
25 See OILWATCH, supra note 4. 
26 See e.g. Chile realiza primer aporte a proyecto Yasuni ITT (Sep. 15, 2010), 




signature of the MOA and notwithstanding its initial posture fostering Correa’s proposal,27 
Germany announced that it would not further support the Yasuni Fund.28 In relation to the civil 
society, the Avina Foundation has also channeled funds to finance this project. 
 
II. Why should the international community pay Ecuador? 
Correa’s proposal is asking the international community for compensation to forgo its ITT 
oil fields. Is there any reason that justifies such payment or is Ecuador asking to be compensated 
for something it is obliged to do in the first place? This Section addresses these questions. 
 
1. Climate justice 
 Climate change is increasingly an inescapable phenomenon for everyone, but its effects are 
especially unavoidable for the poor.29 Indeed, poor nations are more vulnerable to climate 
change than developed ones30 and are expected to suffer its consequences disproportionately.31 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCCC) says that the consequences of climate 
change “will fall disproportionately upon developing countries and poor persons within all 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
November 5, 2010); http://mdtf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/3EYC0 (last visited January 29. 2011); http://yasuni-
itt.gob.ec/blog/2010/12/10/gobierno-regional-de-wallonia-belgica-compromete-contribucion-para-iniciativa-yasuni-
itt/ (last visited January 29. 2011); http://yasuni-itt.gob.ec/blog/2010/12/03/mas-instituciones-se-unen-a-la-
iniciativa-yasuni-itt/ (last visited January 29. 2011); and http://yasuni-itt.gob.ec/blog/2010/11/11/espana-concreta-
contribucion-a-la-iniciativa-yasuni-itt/ (last visited January 29. 2011). 
27 See Alberto Acosta et al., supra note 4. 
28 See Tasmin Walker and Vinicio Chacón, Alemania retira apoyo a fondo ecuatoriano para no explotar petróleo 
(Sep. 27, 2010) http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,6043578,00.html (last visited October 1, 2010). 
29 See PAUL G. HARRIS, WORLD ETHICS AND CLIMATE CHANGE: FROM INTERNATIONAL TO GLOBAL JUSTICE 35-48 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010). 
30 “The relationship between climate change-related suffering and poverty is decidedly direct; as climate change 
increases, so too does the poverty of poor countries and poor people”. Id. at 25. 
31 See STEVE VANDERHEIDEN, ATMOSPHERIC JUSTICE: A POLITICAL THEORY OF CLIMATE CHANGE 45 (New York: 




countries, and thereby exacerbate inequities in health status and access to adequate food, clean 
water, and other resources”.32 Unlike less developed countries, 
the wealthy nations. . . . are in a much better position for three independent reasons. First, they have 
much more adaptive capacity. Second, a small percentage of their economies depend on agriculture, a 
sector that is highly vulnerable to climate change. Third, the wealthy nations are generally in the 
cooler, higher latitudes, which also decreases their vulnerability.33  
 
Climate change is thus a profound matter of justice,34 and raises questions concerning the 
distribution of environmental burdens and benefits among world nations.35 For Steve 
Vanderheiden, “Anthropogenic climate change presents a case of the world’s affluent benefiting 
at the expense of the world’s poor”.36 Accordingly, different climate-justice theories have been 
put forward to justify the moral obligation of rich nations of the North to help poor nations of the 
South in climate change relief. I summarize some of them in the following lines. 
 
(a)  The “polluter pays” (or corrective justice) approach 
This climate-justice account is based on causality and responsibility. It highlights that those 
who are not responsible for causing a problem should not have to pay to fix it; and those who are 
responsible for causing the harm are responsible for righting it.37 Corrective justice is therefore at 
the heart of this account.38 It requires the developed world−those nations who have contributed 
to the problem−to internalize the long-term costs of the activities that have caused the enhanced 
                                                            
32 Cited in id. at 81. 
33 Eric Posner and Cass Sustein, Global Warming and Social Justice, 31 REGULATIONS, 16 (Spring 2008). 
34 See PAUL G. HARRIS, supra note 29, at 35. 
35 See SIMON CANEY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE. IN: 
ROLAND PIERIK AND WOUTER WERNER, COSMOPOLITANISM IN CONTEXT: PERSPECTIVES FROM INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND POLITICAL THEORY 21-22 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).  
36 STEVE VANDERHEIDEN, supra note 31 at 45-46. 
37 See PAUL G. HARRIS, supra note 29 at 38-39. 





GHG effects.39 In other words, due to their past contributions developed nations owe remedial 
action to those nations or those citizens most likely to be harmed by climate change.40  
The President of the Marshall Islands−which are located at an average of seven feet above 
sea level−depicts the polluter pays argument the following way:  
The United States is responsible for 25 percent of all the CO2 emissions in the world. How can it 
drown my nation and not do something about that? What gives it the right to do nothing as my nation 
goes under?41  
 
The corrective justice account presents, however, several theoretical and practical 
difficulties. First, identifying the wrongdoers of climate change seems to be an almost impossible 
task.42 Even if many citizens of developed countries benefit from past GHG emissions, it is 
unclear how many benefitted and to what extent.43  
Second, climate change reveals that there is no identity between the injured victim and the 
claimant.44 In effect, most of the victims of climate change live in the future, and therefore 
cannot be adequately redressed.45 
Third, it is virtually impossible to show that climate change is a direct consequence of 
someone else’s action or inaction (i.e. that the GHG emissions in the United States caused the 
                                                            
39 See EDWARD PAGE, CLIMATE CHANGE, JUSTICE AND FUTURE GENERATIONS 167 (Northampton, Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited, 2006). 
40 See Eric Posner and Cass Sustein, supra note 33, at 14. 
41 Cited in JAY INSLEE AND BRACKEN HENDRICKS, APOLLO’S FIRE: IGNITING AMERICA’S CLEAN-ENERGY ECONOMY 
(Island Press: 2008) at 5. 
42 See ERIC POSNER AND DAVID WEISBACH, supra note 39 at 103-118. 
43 Eric Posner and Cass Sustein highlight the fact that the current stock of carbon dioxide in the air is a consequence 
of the behavior of people in the past who are actually dead, meaning that the actual wrongdoers cannot be punished. 
“Those responsible for much of the greenhouse gas effect are now dead and it seems unfair to shoulder their 
descendants with both the responsibility for their own environmental behavior and that of their ancestors”. In 
addition, they argue that “holding Americans today responsible for the activities of their ancestors is not a fair or 
reasonable on corrective justice grounds because current Americans are not the relevant wrongdoers they are not 
responsible for the harm”. See Eric Posner and Cass Sustein, supra note 33 at 18. By the same token, many citizens 
of developed countries today are not the direct descendants of GHG-emitting citizens of the past, so it is unclear if 
they have actually benefited and to what degree. See ERIC POSNER AND DAVID WEISBACH, supra note 39 at 108. 
44 See ERIC POSNER AND DAVID WEISBACH, supra note 39 at 108. 




melting of ice in a village in Alaska).46 As a matter of fact, there are a variety of difficulties in 
attempting to connect an individual climate-related harm to a particular emitter.47  
Fourth, intentional, reckless, or negligent action is required for a corrective justice claim to 
prosper.48 But GHG-emitting activities cannot be classified as intentional, reckless, or negligent 
until a scientific consensus had been formed and became widely known among the public.49 
Such consensus did not occur until the 1990s.50 
Finally, GHG emissions brought about many benefits to present members of developing 
countries, so the responsibilities of present members of developed countries should be 
discounted to take account of such benefits.51 
For all the above, it looks as if the corrective justice approach is inadequate to address 
climate justice. 
 
(b) The “ability to pay” (or distributive justice) approach 
                                                            
46 On climate change causation see e.g. id. at 109 and David A. Grossman, Tort based climate litigation. IN William 
C. G. Burns and Hari M. Osofky, Adjudicating climate change: State, national and international approaches (USA, 
Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 215. 
47 Douglas Kysar, however, asserts that it is possible to estimate current and past contributions of a particular 
emitter. He argues that plaintiffs do not need to rely on joint and several liability as there are metrics and methods 
available to standardize the warming potential of different gases and to quantify a particular defendant’s 
contribution. In this vein, he stresses that as long as the emissions levels of a particular defendant can be measured, 
that defendant’s contribution to climate change harm can also be estimated. In regards to historical emissions, 
plaintiffs may use other means to undertake such estimations (corporate records, tax filings, government lease 
documents, etc.). One study determined that Exxon Mobil is responsible of 5% of carbon dioxide emissions over the 
last 120 years. See Douglas Kysar, What climate change can do about tort law? __ Envtl. L. __ 26-32 (forthcoming 
2011). Working paper cited with author’s permission. But even though one might consider the probability factor, “It 
is unclear that statistical relationships can be established with sufficient clarity to support a [juridical] claim”. ERIC 
POSNER AND DAVID WEISBACH, supra note 39 at 109. On the other hand, assessing which particular affluent 
country, and to what extent it caused harm is also a daunting task. See PAUL G. HARRIS, supra note 29 at 38-39. 
48 See ERIC POSNER AND DAVID WEISBACH, supra note 39 at 110. 
49 See id. 
50 “[U]ntil the 1990s there was widespread ignorance of the enhanced-GHG nature and scale”. EDWARD PAGE, supra 
note 40 at 169. 




This climate-justice argument rests on the principle that “among a number of parties, all of 
whom are bound to contribute to some endeavor, the parties who have the most resources should 
contribute the most”.52 Accordingly, the question is whether rich nations have a special 
obligation to deal with climate change not because they are principally responsible for the 
problem, but simply because they are rich.53  
In line with Eric Posner and Cass Sustein, the distributive justice approach is problematic 
because, instead of helping current poor people, emission reductions would help poor people in 
the future.54 These authors also claim that poor people in poor nations would prefer a cash 
transfer so they could use the money as they please. “Even if the rich have an obligation to help 
the poor, they should fulfill this obligation in the best possible way, whether this involves cash 
grants, development aids, trade rules or other mechanisms”.55 Lastly, many of the beneficiaries 
of emission reductions are wealthy and many of the losers from emission reductions are poor.56  
Hence the distribute justice account seems also ill-suited to attain climate justice. 
 
(c)  Other justice accounts 
In addition to the corrective and distributive justice accounts, other theories have been 
offered to try to justify the obligations of Northern countries toward Southern ones. First of all, 
the principle of “intergenerational justice” states that current generations have a moral obligation 
not to undermine the rights of future generations. It contends that climate change is unjust toward 
all, whether those whose interests are unprotected are currently alive or will be born in the 
                                                            
52 Id. at 170. 
53 ERIC POSNER AND DAVID WEISBACH, supra note 39 at 73-74. 
54 See Eric Posner and Cass Sustein, supra note 33 at 17. 
55 ERIC POSNER AND DAVID WEISBACH, supra note 39 at 73-74. 




future.57 In other words, “People alive at t1 are under a duty not to act in ways which prevent 
people at t1+50 from being able to enjoy their rights”.58 This requires people in the present to 
limit their overall GHG emissions, accepting some costs now for future generations’ benefits 
later.59 Accordingly, a way of fulfilling this “intergenerational obligation” is for current 
generations to invest in projects such as Ecuador’s, which plan to avoid carbon emissions in the 
long run.  
 Another point of view is that Ecuador−and any other nation whether in the North or 
South−should be compensated for providing the world with a public good when it refrains from 
extracting petroleum that causes carbon emissions.60 Thus, the world should “compensate those 
who produce a positive externality and charge those who produce the negative externality. This 
is what the carbon market does. This is what, in a different way, the Yasuni-ITT initiative 
attempts to do”.61  
More radical postures contend that trees should have legal standing. Christopher Stone 
argues that “we should have a system in which, when a friend of a natural object perceives it to 
be endangered, he can apply to a court for the creation of a guardianship”.62 Therefore, under this 
scheme paying Ecuador will be a way to respect nature’s rights. Here it is interesting to note that 
                                                            
57 See SIMON CANEY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, IN ROLAND PIERIK AND WOUTER WERNER, 
supra note 35. 
58 Id. at 33. 
59 See STEVE VANDERHEIDEN, supra note 31 at 121. 
60 See GRACIELA CHICHILNISKY, Foreword to JOSEPH HENRY VOGEL, THE ECONOMICS OF THE YASUNI INITIATIVE: 
CLIMATE CHANGE AS IF THERMODYNAMICS MATTERED xvi (Anthem Press Ed., 2009).  
61 Id. at xvii. 
62 See CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING? LAW, MORALITY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 8 (New 





2008 Ecuadorian Constitution recognizes nature a as subject of law and not a mere object of 
law.63 
To conclude, human rights doctrines could also be invoked to justify the Yasuni-ITT 
Initiative as it purports the protection indigenous peoples living in the national park from the 
negative impacts of oil exploitation. Actually, for the past decades international organizations 
and NGOs have been working to formulate human rights standards applicable to the world’s 
indigenous peoples.64 As a result, several international instruments have emerged to restrict 
state’s sovereignty in the treatment of the indigenous populations that inhabit its territory65 (such 
as the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples) or accommodated in 
order to embrace indigenous peoples’ rights, such as the American Convention on Human 
Rights.66 
 
2. International justice 
                                                            
63 Artículo 83.-  Son deberes y responsabilidades de las ecuatorianas y los ecuatorianos, sin perjuicio de otros 
previstos en la Constitución y la ley: (…) 6. Respetar los derechos de la naturaleza, preservar un ambiente sano y 
utilizar los recursos naturales de modo racional, sustentable y sostenible. (emphasis added) 
64 See SHARON O’BRIEN, FEDERAL INDIAN POLICIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. IN: 
VINE DELORIA, JR (EDITOR), AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (USA: University of Oklahoma 
Press 1985) at 35. 
65 “Although international law excludes indigenous peoples from its distribution of sovereign authority and renders 
them subject to the sovereign power of the states in which they live, international law. . . . purports to protect 
indigenous peoples from the exercise of sovereign power”. Patrick Macklem, Indigenous peoples recognition in 
international law: theoretical observations, 20 MICH, J. INT’L L. 177 (2008). 
66 In general, these international instruments set forth the following obligations of states vis-à-vis indigenous 
peoples’ rights: to officially title and demarcate indigenous ancestral land; to observe indigenous land tenure 
systems when recognizing indigenous ancestral lands; to restitute lands to those indigenous peoples who were 
dispossessed, or alternatively, to provide other lands or compensation; to conserve and protect indigenous peoples’ 
right to environment; and to respect indigenous peoples’ right to the productive capacity of their lands or territories 
and resources.  See e.g. Jo M. Pasqualucci, International indigenous land rights: a critique of the jurisprudence of 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in light of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, 27 WIS. INT'L L.J. 51 (2009); S. James Anaya and Robert A. Williams, The Protection of Indigenous 
Peoples' Rights over Lands and Natural Resources Under the Inter-American Human Rights System, 14 HARV. 
HUM. RTS. J. 33 (2001); and CLAIRE CHARTERS AND RODOLFO STAVENHAGEN (EDITORS), THE UN DECLARATION ON 




 Climate change is global in its causes and consequences. For this reason, collective 
international action is critical in driving an effective response on the scale required.67 Many 
efforts in the international field have been expended toward addressing climate change. A 
number of the provisions of these international environmental agreements reflect the climate-
justice accounts described in the Section above.  
 For example, the principle of “common but differentiated responsibility” is present in the 
1992 Rio Declaration.68 According to this principle, while all states are responsible for global 
environmental problems, some are “more responsible” than others, both for their past 
contributions and their abilities to pay.69  
 In addition, in the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) states acknowledged that while all of them should be part of efforts to limit 
emissions of GHG, developed states would take the lead70 and would help the world’s poor 
countries address both the causes and consequences of climate change.71 
Article 3 
                                                            
67 See Nicolas Stern, The Stern Review on the economics of climate change. Available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTINDONESIA/Resources/226271-1170911056314/3428109-
1174614780539/SternReviewEng.pdf  
68 Principle 7.- States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore the health and 
integrity of the Earth's ecosystem. In view of the different contributions to global environmental degradation, States 
have common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they 
bear in the international pursuit to sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place on the 
global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they command. (emphasis added)  
69 See PAUL G. HARRIS, supra note 29 at 79-80. 
70 “The UNFCCC contains no binding commitments, and signatory nations agreed only to a nonbinding pledge to 
freeze GHG emissions at 1990 levels pending further study, but its symbolic importance in recognizing the 
importance of the issue and in initiating international political action to address climate change cannot be overstated. 
Additionally, the treaty set most of the normative ideals that continue to guide development and evaluation of the 
fairness of ongoing climate policy negotiations and development. Its declared commitment to equity in both its 
process and substantive policy outputs, though subsequent agreements display significant deficits in both of these 
regards, nonetheless remains the foundational ideal of climate policy development, and its normative language 
continues to serve as the basis for efforts to design a climate regime that realizes these goals”. STEVE 
VANDERHEIDEN, supra note 31 at 55-56. 




1. The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of 
humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the 
lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof (emphasis added). 
 
Further, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol also reflects this principle as it does not require developing 
countries to engage in emission reduction commitments in the assumption that the main 
wrongdoers are developed countries.72 
 Many authors argue, however, that these international environmental law treaties have 
failed to provide an effective solution to climate change. The main critique is that the Kyoto 
Protocol has failed to call on the main emitters of the world like China or the United States,73 the 
latter claiming that this is an unfair treaty.74 In consequence, without the engagement of the 
world’s most polluting nations these treaties are ineffective. 
 By the same token, the climate change regime has been characterized by “diplomatic delay, 
minimal action, and mutual blame”.75 Here it is worth noting that the United States has 
conditioned its participation on future carbon cuts to China’s engagement in similar 
obligations.76 Conversely, China insists that developed countries like the United States move first 
                                                            
72 Id. at 82. 
73 “For many, the American Government remains the primary obstacle blocking the empowerment of an effective 
global climate regime”. See id. at 15. 
74 “I oppose the Kyoto Protocol because it exempts 80 percent of the world, including major population centers such 
as China and India, from compliance, and would cause serious harm to the U.S. economy. The Senate's vote, 95-0, 
shows that there is a clear consensus that the Kyoto Protocol is an unfair and ineffective means of addressing global 
climate change concerns”. Former president George W. Bush, 2001. Cited IN: STEVE VANDERHEIDEN, supra note 
31 at 64. 
75 PAUL G. HARRIS, supra note 29 at 74. 
76 Critics argue that “the US should forge ahead on climate change initiatives, even in the absence of corresponding 
Chinese commitment. . . . [S]etting a positive example is the best option to encourage China to move forward as 
well”. Karin Mickelson, Beyond a politics of the possible? South-North relations and climate justice, 10(2) MELB. J. 




and do more in the light of their historic contributions.77 The result has been procrastination in 
the international fora.  
 The lack of scientific consensus regarding the causes and consequences of climate change 
has also served to slow down the process of reaching a worldwide comprehensive solution: 
[T]he politicization of science by industry opponents of global climate policy efforts, together with 
sympathetic representatives in government, has stymied the development of fair and effective climate 
policy through a coordinated public relations and lobbying campaign designed to undermine the 
scientific basis of climate change, and thereby to convince the public that no mandatory action is 
needed.78 
 
 In general, international environmental treaties like the UNFCCC or Kyoto Protocol divert 
all responsibilities to states (that is, excluding individuals and institutions). As Paul G. Harris 
maintains, to date international justice has failed to discourage consumption and pollution by 
affluent people, whether in the North or South.79 As China develops millions of Chinese citizens 
become affluent and gain access to a vast number of GHG polluting goods. For example, the 
number of cars in China has more than doubled between 2000 and 2006, and still there is a huge 
gap to fill since China has one car per every forty people, whereas the United States has one car 
every two people. Yet these new emerging classes are not obligated to reduce their GHG 
emissions, becoming the new free-riders of air pollution (see infra Section III (b)).  
 According to John Vogler these environmental treaties are, in reality, “interstate 
institutions attempting to superintend what are often global problems. Although nation-states 
remain legally pre-eminent in the world system. . . . they cannot be expected to rise above their 
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79 Paul G. Harris, Climate Change and the Impotence of International Environmental Law: Seeking a Cosmopolitan 




own short-term national [and electoral concerns]”.80  Conversely, Roland Pierik and Wouter 
Werner have identified certain global features in these international environmental instruments, 
though still ruled by international justice rather than global justice: 
Increasingly, international law has incorporated notions such as “the common bonds” and the “shared 
heritage” of all peoples, the idea of human dignity, or the notion that environmental protection is a 
“common concern of humankind”. Of course, this is not to say that all international institutions and 
regimes are now founded upon cosmopolitan principles or moving progressively towards ideals of 
global justice (emphasis added).81  
  As a final point, in line with Karin Michelson the North-South dichotomy underlying 
international justice is inadequate these days.82 She explains that countries like Brazil, India, and 
China should not be considered as “developing nations” anymore. She also emphasizes that the 
vulnerability to climate change cannot be defined in geographic terms (North-South), as 
evidenced by hurricane Katrina and indigenous peoples’ suffering in the far North. In the same 
line of reasoning, Posner and Sustein assert that the reliance on distributive and corrective justice 
“muddy the picture and threaten to interfere with efforts to negotiate an effective climate treaty 
in the future”.83  
 In the previous paragraphs I have shown that inter-state justice is neither willing nor 
attuned to the requirements of a global battle against climate change.84 So, instead of thinking of 
the global environmental problem as involving exclusively the duties of justice among states, 
“we should think of it as one that [also] involves actions and responsibilities among individuals 
                                                            
80 JOHN VOGLER, THE GLOBAL COMMONS: ENVIRONMENTAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL GOVERNANCE (2d Ed), (West 
Sussex: John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2000).  
81 ROLAND PIERIK AND WOUTER WERNER, supra note 35. 
82 Karin Michelson, Beyond politics of the possible? South-North relations and climate justice Melbourne Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 10, No. 2, Oct 2009: 411-423. 
83 Eric Posner and Cass Sustein, supra note 33 at 20. 




and institutions”.85 Thus an alternative to the inter-state doctrine is needed.86 And that alternative 
is cosmopolitanism.  
 
3.  Cosmopolitan justice 
 Climate change cries out for a cosmopolitan response. A global problem with global causes 
and consequences should be addressed from a global perspective, and not from an international 
or inter-state one.87 In Harris’ words, “Our future requires that our responses to the globalization 
of environmental changes and their consequences include a globalization of justice”.88 This 
Section will show why the cosmopolitan justice serves to justify the compensation envisaged by 
Ecuadorians. 
International justice views national borders as being the basis for justice.89 Indeed, from a 
communitarian perspective “states have very few duties of justice towards one another, and even 
less so towards people living in another states”.90 On the contrary, cosmopolitan justice asserts 
that “the ethical obligations and responsibilities are not defined or delineated by national 
borders”.91 Hence, while the communitarians rely on the moral obligations between members of 
local associations,92 for the cosmopolitans “it makes no difference whether a person lives here or 
there, provided that, wherever he lives, he lives a citizen of the world”.93   
                                                            
85 PAUL G. HARRIS, supra note 29 at 111. 
86 See id. at 94. 
87 See id. at 118. 
88 Id. at 184. 
89 See Paul G. Harris, supra note 79 at 6. 
90 PAUL G. HARRIS, supra note 29 at 56. 
91 Id. 
92 See SHARON ANDERSON-GOLD, COSMOPOLITANISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 
2001). For Paul G. Harris, “communitarians would probably say that obligation is close to oneself – to one’s family, 
neighbors and nation. Communitarians emphasize that individuals are constituted, at least in large part, by the 




Cosmopolitans claim that all citizens of the world share a membership in one single 
community: the world as a whole.94 Under this account, individuals develop multiple loyalties 
not only to one’s own state but also to other human beings living far away.95 Therefore, every 
person has moral duties toward all human beings since every human being is the ultimate unit of 
moral concern.96 The reason for this is that human beings are all inextricably interconnected to 
the extent that “a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere”.97 In short, under 
the cosmopolitan regime a global citizen allegiance is to the community of human beings in the 
entire world.98  
Cosmopolitanism, though universalist and totalizing,99 does not reject the idea that 
solutions to climate change involve states. While recognizing the role of states in climate change 
abatement, cosmopolitanism does not “absolve capable [affluent] individuals from explicit 
responsibility and obligation; nor should it prevent diplomats, activists and scholars, along with 
laypersons, from discussing it and attempting to implement it personally”.100 In sum, 
cosmopolitan justice “locates the obligation to act on climate change, and to aid those people 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
help people only in their own community or at most in their own country… The interstate system under which we 
live today is one based on communitarian principles, often in extreme. This Westphalian world view is one premised 
on a particular kind of communitarianism, which asserts that people’s identities and their moral values arise not 
from some common humanity or universal values, but rather from shared traditions within established communities. 
PAUL G. HARRIS, supra note 29 at 29-30. 
93 SHARON ANDERSON-GOLD, id. 
94 See ROLAND PIERIK AND WOUTER WERNER, supra note 35.  
95 See PAUL G. HARRIS, supra note 29 at 30-31.  
96 Id. 
97 GARRET WALLACE BROWN, GROUNDING COSMOPOLITANISM, FROM KANT TO THE IDEA OF A COSMOPOLITAN 
CONSTITUTION 1 (Edinburg: Edinburg University Press, 2009).  
98 See id. at 2.  
99 See PAUL G. HARRIS, supra note 29 at 30-31. 




who are suffering from it. . . . in capable (i.e. affluent) individuals in both affluent and poor 
states”.101  
In the light of the above, the cosmopolitan justice account can serve to justify Ecuador’s 
call for citizens of the world to contribute to the Yasuni Fund. Ecuador’s proposal stems from the 
idea that national borders are not an adequate basis for climate change justice. So, if borders do 
not matter, the solutions should involve transnational solidarity among world citizens, and not 
states alone. Further, cosmopolitanism requires citizens to take actions personally because 
everyone has a basic right “not to be harmed by the pollution of others, whether they be next 
door or on the other side of the planet”.102 In this line, the Yasuni-ITT Initiative calls out for the 
contribution not only of state parties but also of a multiplicity of global actors, including private 
and public entities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and individuals. It purports to 
mobilize global citizens, regardless of their national commitments and allegiances, by invoking 
universal values.103 
On the other hand, the proposal implies that the world’s affluent people–and not only those 
from the North–have a moral duty to confront the negative effects of climate change toward all 
human beings. Affluent American and European citizens, together with affluent Ecuadorians and 
Chinese, are all summoned. This is why the initiative goes beyond the North-South dichotomy 
which has traditionally brought about mutual blame and delay. Conversely, the protagonists of 
the cosmopolitan regime purported by Correa are not only states but affluent individuals.  
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What is more, Correa’s program strongly acknowledges the urge of taking immediate 
action and not waiting for the outcome of lethargic and virtually immobile international 
negotiations, as states attempt to reach a new post-Kyoto framework. The initiative is therefore 
attuned to the current and compelling exigencies of abating climate change without further delay, 
as opposed to the inter-state justice approach.  
All told, I believe that the cosmopolitan standpoint–which is inherent in the Yasuni-ITT 
Initiative–provides a better road map (or at least a subsidiary one) than the inter-state doctrine for 
dealing with climate justice.104 Even so, the cosmopolitan regime has some flaws to overcome.  
The world is still characterized by a lack of institutional cosmopolitan networks beyond 
state level. As Luis Cabrera states, 
[f]ull acknowledgment of the demands of moral cosmopolitanism. . . . should commit us to strong 
institutional cosmopolitanism, specifically, to the creation of a network of strong democratic 
institutions above the state. The fully integrated institutional form would be a democratic global 
government capable of ensuring that any person born anywhere can lead a decent life (emphasis 
added).105  
 
So, in light of the lack of a cosmopolitan legal framework pursuant to climate justice, how are 
cosmopolitan obligations supposed to be set, enforced, and by whom?  
The cosmopolitan regime relies primarily on the voluntary efforts of world citizens to take 
action regardless of borders. Whether domiciled in the North or South, whether the beneficiary 
of past GHG emissions or not, all affluent human beings are summoned. In the absence of a 
“democratic global government”, as Cabrera puts it, the global affluent citizens are required to 
voluntarily contribute to measures that abate climate change in an effort to avoid free-riding, 
taking responsibility for their own GHG emissions, and off-setting their individual carbon 
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footprints (see infra Section III (b)). However, cosmopolitanism is not equipped with 
enforcement mechanisms.  
On top of that, the cosmopolitan regime will require a definition or threshold for 
“affluence” in order to allocate responsibilities thoroughly. Yet this point requires further 
discussion beyond the scope of this paper. What is clear for now is that cosmopolitanism can 
seriously materialize in concrete measures that favor carbon sequestration to be undertaken by 
capable global citizens. Among such measures I can highlight the financing of conservation 
easements in the South, as I will discuss below.  
 
4. Is Ecuador asking to be compensated to do something it is obliged to do? 
 Here I will briefly address the skeptical question whether Ecuador is, in actuality, driven 
by conservationist goals or if it is actually asking to be compensated for something it is obliged 
to do in the first place.  
 Ecuador is a signatory for different environmental treaties aimed at the protection of the 
Amazon’s biological diversity. Does this mean that Ecuador is asking for money to fulfill its 
international obligations? I think not as Ecuador’s international commitments do not compel it to 
forgo its oil reserves, even when dealing with sensitive areas such as the Amazon. Hence, the 
decision whether to exploit its natural resources is still a sovereign prerogative, even if 
conservation strategies must be implemented simultaneously pursuant to Ecuador’s international 
obligations. 
 As described above, the exploitation of the ITT oil fields appears to be complex and 




construct a thermoelectric power plant and a pipeline to move the oil from the Amazon to the 
coast (see supra Section I.1). Skeptics will say in turn that Ecuador is seeking compensation as it 
has realized the unfeasibility of its oil exploitation project. Yet, as complicated as it may be, it 
seems that the exploitation of the natural resources is still feasible and, to some extent, several oil 
companies are willing to undertake this endeavor. In fact, different oil companies already operate 
in other blocks located in the Yasuni National Park, including Brazil’s Petrobras, Canada’s 
EnCana, and Spain’s and Argentina's Repsol-YPF.106 In other words, technicalities are not an 
impediment for the ITT oil project. 
 Additionally, in 2006 the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACmHR) 
granted precautionary measures in favor of the Tagaeri and Taromenami indigenous peoples who 
inhabit the Ecuadorian Amazon jungle.107 In view of this, the IACmHR requested that the 
Ecuadorian government adopt the measures necessary to protect the territory inhabited by these 
indigenous peoples. Skeptics will contend that Ecuador is obligated to protect the indigenous 
peoples by refraining from exploiting its oil reserves. However, the IACmHR pronouncement is 
not only a (non-binding) recommendation, but it does not prevent Ecuador from exploiting its oil 
reserves within the territories of indigenous peoples. In this regard, the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights has ruled that the rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and 
resources does not prevent the state from granting concessions for the exploration and extraction 
of natural resources within indigenous territory when certain conditions are met.108 In other 
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words, if Ecuador undertakes the consultation processes with the native peoples and guarantees 
their rights, the eventual oil exploitation of the ITT oil fields will be legally vested.  
 In light of the above, I do not regard Ecuador’s proposal as a countermeasure to the 
impossibility of exploiting the oil reserves due to its environmental and human rights obligations, 
nor to avoid complex expenditures needed to access oil reserves. Although some people may 
claim that Ecuador is asking for compensation for what it is legally obligated to do (that is, to 
preserve the forests and protect the indigenous tribes) it appears that the Yasuni-ITT Initiative 
purports extra-legal objectives, which certainly have a cost. 
 
III.  The critique 
 Considering the novelty of the Ecuadorian proposal, the academic literature on it is still 
limited. However, much of the available articles, legal or not, are devoted to praising Correa’s 
model. For example, Tracy C. Davis underscores the potential of the program “to shift the 
existing environmental and development paradigms”.109 Leaving the oil underground, she 
argues, is “striking in its scope and creativity”.110 In the same way, Graciela Chichilnisky 
considers the initiative to be “an innovative response from Latin America to the procrastination 
of the global negotiations for a post-Kyoto framework”.111 She goes further by affirming that the 
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that] the free, prior, and informed consent of indigenous peoples is only necessary when the state is considering 
“large-scale development or investment projects that would have a major impact” on the territory of indigenous or 
tribal peoples”. Jo M. Pasqualucci, supra note 66. Although the scope of the Saramaka case is still unclear, it seems 
that the circumstances in which indigenous peoples’ consent is essential before a government can grant (large) 
concession rights over natural resources located within aboriginal lands, have been limited. Moreover, it appears that 
indigenous peoples are not vested with “veto powers” over the activities to be undertaken within their lands as 
authorized by the national government. 
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“Yasuni is the new economics of planet Earth”.112 Similarly, Pamela Martin contends that the 
initiative is a lesson for academics and policymakers who are seeking innovative solutions to 
protect the environment.113 At last, Alberto Costa underlines the importance of the project as a 
way to promote the transformation of Ecuador’s economic model currently based on the 
exploitation of natural resources.114 
 As I will explain in this Section, my vision is less enthusiastic.  
How really innovative is Ecuador’s scheme? The Yasuni-ITT Initiative originates from a 
well-known legal institution, the moratorium. Moratoriums entail “a suspension of activities 
determined by a governmental authority for numerous reasons. They are found at all levels of 
government in all manner of activities, from federal offshore oil leases, to a country’s 
moratorium on landfills or building permits”.115 Correa’s initiative seeks to establish an oil 
moratorium in the ITT fields, overlapped to the Yasuni National Park, for an unlimited period of 
time. Yet the very idea of approving an oil moratorium, in general, and in the Amazonian region 
of Ecuador, in particular, is not a new idea.116  
In my view, the novelty of the model relies on two facts. First, the moratorium is intended 
to be perpetual; and second, Ecuador is conditioning its issuance to a minimum threshold of 
contributions to the Yasuni Fund. Hence the message goes as follows: if the international 
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community and the cosmopolitan citizens of the world want Ecuador to keep the oil in the soil 
for perpetuity, and thus avoid the release of millions of tons of carbon dioxide that would 
otherwise be burned and pollute the atmosphere, they must pay for it. 117 
 In this Section I will analyze to what extent the Yasuni-ITT Initiative represents an 
adequate framework to abate climate change, with particular emphasis on a property-based 
approach.  
 
(a) The focus on the oil and not on the trees 
 Ecuador is requiring as compensation half the opportunity cost of exploiting the ITT oil 
reserves. The calculation for the envisaged payment is not based on how much carbon dioxide 
the Amazonian rainforest will absorb or avoid (see infra (b)), but on the market value of the oil 
reserves.118 
 In my opinion, the Yasuni-ITT Initiative places the economic incentives in the wrong 
place. Indeed, instead of making Ecuador preserve its rainforests from land use transformation, 
the initiative is primarily structured around the oil. In other words, Ecuador is asking to be 
compensated for not doing something (that is, not exploiting oil reserves) rather than for doing 
something (that is, preserving the forest areas). While a conservationist approach would require 
affirmative obligations from Ecuador, forgoing the oil reserves simply implies passivity or 
inaction. As put by Mr. Sebastian Lesch, spokesman of the German Ministry of Economic and 
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Development Cooperation, in direct reference to the Yasuni-ITT Initiative, “nuestro objetivo es 
impulsar políticas activas en países activos, en vez de pagarles por no hacer nada”.119 
 Like the German officials, others have criticized the exaggerated emphasis that the 
initiative places on the oil payment,120 and have questioned whether the funds obtained will be 
adequately channeled to protect indigenous peoples and preserve biodiversity, as purported.121 In 
this regard, the threshold of $100 million to be raised before December 2011 as stipulated in the 
MOA is a clear manifestation of the excessive weight given to the economic aspect of the 
proposal by Ecuadorian authorities. Some may argue that the economic emphasis, and especially 
the “deadline” established by Ecuador, is a deal breaker.  
 But why did Ecuador structure its initiative around the oil and not the trees? There may be 
three possible answers. First, since Ecuador is not the legal owner of all the surface lands where 
the Yasuni Park is located, the government’s embarking into conservation strategies would 
require negotiating with indigenous peoples, both in terms of boundaries and “profit sharing”. 
This fact might have been regarded as a source of delay or a dead-end for the endeavor, 
especially considering that after the IACmHR issued its recommendation, the rights of the 
indigenous peoples have been in an international spotlight. Second, the wilderness and 
inaccessibility of the area not only renders conservation objectives extremely complex, but also 
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prohibitive in terms of costs and resources. Third, the calculations of how many oil barrels are 
stored in the subsurface of the national park are already available thanks to oil prospecting, 
whereas the calculations of how much carbon can be absorbed are not only not available, but 
hard to determine (see infra Section IV). Perhaps most importantly, Ecuador might have 
perceived that by focusing on the oil it would maximize its cut.  
 As I should point out immediately, the focus on the oil is not only the weakest point of the 
whole project, but also may result in a deterrent to future international cooperation as Germany’s 
reaction evidences. 
 
(b) CGYs are not “environmental property rights” 
 The atmosphere is a “global commons”, that is to say, a resource that does not or cannot 
fall under sovereign jurisdiction of a particular state because of the physical impossibility of 
extending such control.122 Global commons are open to all and are free for the taking.123 In fact, 
they can be used by all states and their nationals for resource extraction (in the case of the ocean) 
or waste disposal (in the case of the atmosphere).124 
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 Considering human’s self-interest nature, it is generally believed that users will deplete a 
commons if left unregulated or unowned.125  Since none of the users of a commons can exclude 
anyone else from the resource, this circumstance encourages overuse and discourages 
investment. As a result, “all [users] become free riders, taking as much as they can and investing 
nothing, and turning otherwise renewable resources into wasting assets”.126 This is why 
determining who has access to common resources, and to what extent, is at the heart of this 
“tragedy of the commons”.127 
 Air pollution exemplifies this tragedy. Given that the atmosphere cannot be fenced128 or 
parceled into shares129, individuals, companies, and states will tend to “free-ride” by letting 
others take on the costs of mitigating the impacts of their pollution (in the form of carbon 
emissions) while they continue to enjoy the benefits of those activities.130 In consequence, they 
impose the external costs of their activities on society in the form of reduced air quality and 
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disruption of global climate regulation services.131 As put by Posner and Weisbach, “Whenever 
people engage in activities that emit carbon. . . . they deplete the resource but do not pay a price 
for the hard they impose on others.”132 
 The atmosphere can only absorb a limited amount of carbon dioxide.133 Since 1750 global 
atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide and other GHG have been increasing 
exponentially, and now exceed by far the atmospheric concentrations prior to industrialization.134 
Climate change is therefore the result of the atmosphere reaching its carrying capacity to absorb 
GHG.135 The global dimensions of the tragedy are obvious given that the atmosphere provides 
the planet’s respiratory function by absorbing carbon dioxide and emitting oxygen,136 which are 
essential functions to human biological, cultural, and social reproduction. This is why climate 
change presents itself as a global tragedy of the commons. 
 Is it possible to overcome this tragedy? The answer is either to impose regulation or to 
privatize the commons.137 Regulation refers to government regulation imposing restrictions on 
access and use of the commons, either through command-and-control measures or market-based 
incentives, whereas privatizing the commons relies on converting the resource from non-property 
to private property.138 As mentioned before, this paper will focus on the latter. 
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 Property rights can thus help individuals internalize their externalities.139 In the past years, 
there has been a growing recognition that environmental concerns are essentially property rights 
problems.140 In fact, property rights create powerful incentives to preserve the value of what 
people own.141  In Terry L. Anderson and Donald Leal’s words, the key to overcoming market 
failure−and climate change is the greatest and widest-ranging market failure142−is to establish 
well-specified,143 enforceable,144 and transferable145 property rights (what Professor Carol M. 
Rose calls the “modernist” features of property rights).146 
Efforts to enhance conservation strategies through the creation of property rights in 
environmental resources are being broadly recommended.147 According to Anderson, “If we 
wish to continue to improve the environment, ultimately we are going to have to turn the 
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environment into an asset; make it something that people, who are the stewards, are rewarded for 
producing”.148 Examples of these “new” forms of property rights in environmental resources are 
conservation easements and tradable emission rights, also referred to as “environmental property 
rights”.149  
Although conservation easements and tradable emission rights appear as “new” forms (or 
“evolved” forms of property rights) they rely on the “modernist” property features characterized 
by Anderson and Leal. Accordingly, “environmental property rights” like tradable emission 
rights must be well-defined, relatively simple, and uniform to understand. For them to work, it 
should be possible to monitor and measure emissions, and the amounts and types of emissions 
should be a matter of public record enforceable by administrators and courts.150 Furthermore, it is 
worth noticing that these new forms of property rights will come later in the development of 
property rights because they are more complex, have less political support, rely on sophisticated 
monitoring systems, and are expensive forms of “public infrastructure”.151  
Having explored the concept of “environmental property rights”, in the following lines I 
argue that the CGYs created by the Yasuni-ITT Initiative are not well-defined, enforceable, and 
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transferable “environmental property rights”. In fact, even though the Yasuni Fund aims to 
contribute to abate global warming through the creation of a new currency (the CGYs), the 
problem with the design of the proposal is that, in actuality, contributors to the fund will not own 
anything at the end of the day. I will unpack these ideas next. 
First of all, the content of the CGYs is not clear and cannot be measured or registered. 
What are the CGYs? They are certificates issued by a sovereign state (Ecuador) containing the 
unilateral promise to forgo part of its oil reserves (the ITT oil reserves) for perpetuity. However, 
the CGYs do not represent a portion of the oil reserves at stake, an oil barrel, or even a real 
avoided carbon emission. Contributors to the Yasuni Fund are buying nothing more than a bona 
fide promise from Ecuador. Sadly enough, it is a promise that the Ecuadorian government may, 
and I am convinced that it certainly will, breach sometime in the near future subject to the swings 
of political pendulums.  
It is true that the CGYs will include reference to the metric tons of avoided carbon 
according to the price of the EUAs market at the time of the transaction. Does this make them an 
avoided carbon emission? I think not, since that feature is either merely referential (depending on 
how much you pay, and when you pay, you will buy more or fewer avoided carbon emissions) or 
subject to the future recognition of CGYs as carbon credits under current or post-Kyoto regimes. 
Thus the weakness of the CGYs relies on the fact that they have been created in reference to 




as inter-exchangeable currency in the future152 (what some refer to as the “linking” of emissions 
trading regimes).153 
 In order to see the problem more clearly, I will now compare the CGYs with carbon credits 
issued under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). A “Certified 
Emission Reduction” (CER) is a unit representing a ton of carbon dioxide-equivalent sequestered 
or abated. It represents an entitlement to release a certain quantity of GHG into to the 
atmosphere.154 A CER is an effective and actual ton of carbon reduction because it is issued after 
the implementation of a given CDM project in a developing country that is party to the Kyoto 
Protocol and has effectively reduced carbon emissions due to the “additionality”155 of that 
project. CERs “represent a reduction of GHG emissions resulting from a defined project activity, 
calculated on the basis of the comparison between the level of verified actual emissions and the 
baseline scenario”.156 Further, in this scheme carbon reductions are real and measurable units,157 
which are monitored, verified, and issued by independent entities. In addition, CERs are widely 
recognized in both the Kyoto and voluntary carbon markets and are easily exchangeable as a way 
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to help Annex I parties fulfill their reduction targets. In short, CERs are well-defined, 
enforceable, and transferable rights.  
 By contrast, the CGYs are not the product of a real, effective, and measurable sustainable 
development project aimed to reduce carbon emissions. They do not represent a ton of avoided 
carbon because the certificate is issued according to the face value in US dollars of the 
contribution, not the actual reduction. The amount is then converted to referential carbon tons 
according to the amount paid in a given time. This is why the CGYs are non-effective and non-
actual avoided carbon reductions issued by Ecuador (which by the way is certainly not an 
independent body as the one issuing CERs). In sum, the CGYs are ill-defined, non-measurable, 
and non-recordable unilateral promises. Simply put, the CGYs are paper-rights. 
 Second, the CGYs are not well suited to assure that Ecuador will ultimately comply with 
its obligation to forgo the oil reserves in the future.158 In my opinion, the incentives are not 
correctly aligned. The CGYs cannot be enforced by courts as they do not represent a well-
defined, measurable, and recorded right. No court, domestic or international, could solve any 
controversy around a CGY transaction or, especially, could dare to reverse a potential decision of 
Ecuador to exploit the ITT oil reserves. As a sad anticipation of what will happen sooner or later, 
the mere text of the certificate includes a provision stating that “in the event that the Government 
defaults on its commitment and decides to initiate oil prospecting in the Yasuni ITT oil fields, 
the CGYs will entitle the holders to be reimbursed by the Government”.159 As they do not 
represent a right or a sufficient title, the CGYs cannot stop Ecuador from breaching the oil 
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moratorium. Finally, given that a CGY is not a clear and recognizable currency to the rest of the 
world, it cannot be easily and widely transferred across borders. 
 For all the above, I consider that the CGYs do not represent “environmental property 
rights”, and are therefore insufficient to attain the objectives of the initiative. 
 
(c) Lack of institutional framework 
As pointed out in the previous Section, one of the weaknesses of the Yasuni-ITT Initiative 
is the fact that it is a unilateral effort lacking an institutional framework. Unlike carbon credit 
transactions under the Kyoto Protocol, the CGYs lack the institutional skeleton that gives CERs 
its definition, measure, recordability, and tradability features. Although it is true that some 
markets emerge without an institutional support, like the voluntary market of carbon credits, it is 
also true that such markets have emerged parallel to and inspired by the Kyoto CERs market.  
The lack of an institutional framework may prove to be a real obstacle for the replication of 
the proposal in other Amazonian states, as purported by Ecuador and the UNDP. The eventual 
success of the project relies on the future availability (and willingness) of other carbon markets 
to validate, homologate or convert the CGYs as exchangeable currency equivalent to CERs or 
carbon credits, whatever the conversion rate the parties agree on. Simply put, the CGYs are 
conditioned to the future (and contingent) “linking” of carbon emission trading schemes. 
 Certainly, unilateral efforts are courageous, especially when they originate from 
developing nations. But in the absence of institutional support, unilateral endeavors like 





(d) Lack of ripeness of property rights in Ecuador 
 Following Professor Rose’s line of reasoning, “environmental property rights” are 
sophisticated and complex forms of property rights, which mean that they “are likely to come 
last of all in the infrastructure train of roads, property rights and environmental rights”.160 As 
mentioned before, these kinds of property rights rely on “modernist” property features (see supra 
Section III.2). 
 The problem with Ecuador, as with many other developing nations, is that its property 
boundaries are not settled yet. Consequently, Ecuador is not ready to evolve to a new generation 
of property rights. As a matter of fact, the boundaries of indigenous peoples’ territories, the 
Yasuni National Park and the ITT oil reserves are not yet completely defined in legal and 
physical terms (see supra Section I.1). On the contrary, in the Amazonian region of Ecuador 
there is a convergence of conflicting and overlapping interests between communities, state, and 
oil companies.  
 Furthermore, Ecuador’s natural resources legal regime exacerbates the lack of 
predictability and rule of law. In Ecuador the law creates a difference between subsurface 
titleholders (natural resources belong to the nation, meaning that there is no private property over 
them), and surface titleholders (it allows private property but does not grant control over 
subsurface resources). 
In Ecuador, current use-specific national laws pose a number of conflicts, rendering insecure rights by 
lack of exclusive ownership. Cultural systems vary widely in their land ownership systems, creating 
equitable concerns. Subsurface rights infringe upon surface rights, precluding exclusive ownership. 
Enforcement of any existing property rights is compounded by conflicting laws and a weak judiciary 
(emphasis added).161 
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Moreover, the government is entitled to grant surface easements guaranteeing subsurface 
extraction in favor of oil companies.162 In the Amazon, this provision affects primarily 
indigenous peoples who find themselves coexisting with surrounding oil exploitation projects 
licensed by the government, but have no legal right to oppose to the carrying out of such 
activities of “national interest”. In addition, oil extraction within national parks may be permitted 
by the government on legal grounds.163  
 Overall, Ecuador’s property regime is characterized by a number of incompatible and 
competing uses emerging as a result of conflicting laws, the impossibility of surface users to 
exclude subsurface uses, and weak law enforcement.164 It goes without saying that the existence 
of numerous rights holders frustrates a socially desirable outcome. This situation resembles the 
so-called “tragedy of the anti-commons”, that is, a situation where too much property rights 
wrecks markets.165 
 In this context, where “modernist” property infrastructure is not (yet) in place, new forms 
of property rights are unlikely to appear. This means that property rights cannot naturally evolve 
to the next generation of rights because the Amazon lacks the minimum modernist features 
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described above. Hence before moving toward a new system Ecuador has a pending task to 
finalize the construction of the property “infrastructure” in the Amazon region.166  
  
(e) Disregard of indigenous peoples’ rights 
 Since 2007 different Ecuadorian agencies, in collaboration with non-governmental 
organization have been discussing the Yasuni-ITT Initiative. I have no information on whether 
indigenous peoples were consulted in the structuring of the proposal. What is clear, though, is 
that indigenous peoples are not currently part of the management of the Yasuni Fund, nor have 
they been empowered to participate in the decision making of which projects are to be executed 
with the collaborations. As Davis contends,  
it is not clear, however, how President Correa proposes to handle the rights of indigenous peoples who 
call the ITT oilfield and surrounding areas home. While he has indicated that his proposal would 
protect these people’s traditional way of life, the details of this aspect of the proposal have not yet 
fully emerged (emphasis added).167 
 
 Here I see two main contingencies. First, the lack of consultation and participation of 
indigenous peoples affect the legitimacy of the project, and may also amount to a violation of 
Ecuador’s international human rights obligations. This is why the exclusion of indigenous 
peoples from forest conservation strategies makes little sense, especially when they are the 
natural guardians of the forest they inhabit.   
[A]greement seems to be forming around the notion that many of the past problems with forest 
protection could have been avoided if free, prior, and informed consent had been extended to those 
who know the forest best: indigenous communities and cultures that have lived harmoniously in 
forests for many centuries. Thus, the key questions may be whether decisions affecting indigenous 
peoples’ lives will continue to be made without their meaningful (as opposed to pro-forma) 
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participation or whether indigenous communities have the right to speak for the forests and their deep 
connection with them (emphasis added).168 
 Second, indigenous peoples may eventually sue the government in an attempt to obtain an 
interest over the Yasuni Fund. Although the legality of their claim may be contested (after all, 
indigenous peoples own the surface lands but not the oil reserves), this may result in further 
delays and more negotiations, deterring international cooperation through the UNDP.  
 Furthermore, it is worth noting that any decision that Ecuador undertakes with regard to the 
Yasuni National Park has the potential to impinge on indigenous peoples’ free exercise of their 
ancestral territories, impairing their legal title and the bundle of rights recognized therein. This is 
why any alternative to abate climate change using the lands of indigenous peoples, and most 
importantly, using the natural resources located therein, must actively involve them.  
  
 In this Section I have tried to show that Correa’s proposal is ill-suited to attain the 
objective of abating climate change. Notwithstanding its cosmopolitan breath, the proposal has 
several structural problems that seriously affect its scope and transcendence, as proven by the 
slow support that the project has received to date by other nations. Although the Yasuni-ITT 
Initiative is already in place, I think there are other alternative models that may, from a property-
based perspective, attain the same objectives in forest conservation, protection of indigenous 
peoples, and carbon sequestration in a more efficient manner. I will address these alternatives in 
the following and final Section. 
 
IV. The alternatives 
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 In this Section I propose three alternatives to Correa’s model. First, selling the oil reserves; 
second, valorizing the ecosystem services; and third, establishing a conservation easement.  
 
(a) Selling the oil reserves 
 Ecuador’s proposal is based on an oil moratorium which relies entirely on the bona fide of 
the government. An alternative way is to sell the ITT oil reserves. By a relatively simple 
purchase contract, Ecuador could transfer–at market price–the ITT oil reserves to a third party, 
say, an NGO, a multilateral organism, a corporation, a trust, or any other legal vehicle. By 
transferring the property to an independent vehicle, the decision of whether to exploit the oil 
reserves is taken away from the political control of Ecuador. In this way, the contingency of a 
future Ecuadorian government breaching the oil moratorium is eliminated significantly. (Note 
that this alternative model cannot eliminate the political contingency completely, as the risk of 
expropriation or a taking is latent anyway).  
 On the other hand, this model has the advantage of creating well-defined, enforceable, and 
tradable rights. The contributor would not have a paper-right (like a CGY), but rather would hold 
a share, a quota, an interest or other entitlement over the oil reserves, or even a number of oil 
barrels, according to the vehicle chosen for the transaction. Hence in this property-based scheme 
there are well-defined rights (the contributor owns part of the oil reserves), enforceable 
(controversies are solved by state courts or arbitration according to the contract) and transferable 




 However promising, selling the oil reserves is not legal under in Ecuador, since natural 
resources belong to the state and are inalienable pursuant to Ecuador’s Constitution.169 In 
consequence, while the state is entitled to award concessions contracts to explore and exploit 
natural resources to private parties, it cannot award private property over the oil reserve itself. 
For the aforementioned reasons, selling the oil reserves has to be discarded as a feasible 
alternative to the Yasuni-ITT model.  
 
(b) Valorizing the ecosystem services  
 Forests ecosystems sequester and store vast amounts of carbon dioxide. Indeed, half of the 
global terrestrial carbon pool is stored in forests.170 When forest areas are cleared for agricultural 
or other purposes carbon stored within these ecosystems is released.171 But land use change also 
sacrifices the future sequestration of carbon by these ecosystems.172 This is why while 
afforestation and reforestation are important efforts, for reasons related to land use patterns, 
younger forests do not store as much carbon as mature forests.173 Thus the preservation of 
primary forests is pivotal in carbon offsetting. 
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 Carbon sequestration carried out by primary forests is an example of what ecologists and 
economists call “ecosystem services”.174 They are defined as  
the processes of ecosystems that directly or indirectly support human wellbeing. These services may 
be grouped into four broad categories according to the functions they perform: regulation, habitat, 
production and information functions. Regulation functions relate to the capacity of ecosystems to 
regulate essential ecological processes as the regulation of global climate. . . . While all of these 
services are important, regulation functions are essential to a healthy [and] functioning biosphere 
(emphasis added).175 
 
Ecosystem services are generally taken for granted. Currently, efforts to valorize ecosystem 
services are undertaken in different parts of the world. Examples include incentivizing 
landowners of tropical areas to preserve primary forest mass (that is, a commitment not to cut 
down the trees) or to reforest previously logged areas. Although such mechanisms were not 
adequately addressed under the Kyoto Protocol, current discussions within the UNFCCC include 
programs like Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing 
Countries (REDD). 
 This “forest carbon offset” approach is relatively simple, has proven relatively successful 
and has been considered for future international agreements.176  
The forests of the global South offer an alluring financial and ecological sink: If you can pay poor 
governments and/or poor people to reforest or not deforest, and you can get credit for the resulting 
saved carbon credit that you can use to offset your emissions, you can both sell your emissions 
reduction credits, and continue business as usual in the North.177 
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The application of the “forest carbon offset” approach to the Yasuni National Park would 
find great sympathy in the international community, even in a context of uncertainty concerning 
the post-Kyoto rules, as it is considered an internationally-accepted measure to mitigate climate 
change.178 Therefore, it is imperative to valorize and compensate the ecosystem services 
provided by the Yasuni National Park for carbon sequestration. World citizens are all free riders, 
profiting from the clean air and carbon offsetting the Amazon forest provides, but not sharing the 
costs for its preservation: 
Many of the benefits provided by forests are currently considered part of the global commons and are 
freely available for everybody. Forests purify air. . . . and act as carbon storehouses - all of which 
humans treat as unlimited and free services. Typically, no legal rights and consequently no monetary 
value are assigned to these services (emphasis added).179 
 
In this alternative model the incentives are placed correctly. It fosters Ecuador to conserve, 
protect, and restore its forests in order to obtain the carbon credits that it can later sell to 
developed nations. Developing policy mechanisms that provide incentives for forest protection 
“would help minimize the current market failures that allow for the destruction of tropical forests 
worldwide”.180 The money obtained could be invested in public programs and policies aimed at 
enforcing environmental legislation, providing support for economic alternatives to felling of the 
trees.181 
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One of the crucial questions that emerges in the context of REDD is how the rights of 
indigenous peoples and local communities will be protected.182 This model will require involving 
indigenous peoples in the program, not only to avoid potential human rights contingencies but to 
ensure the conservation objectives in the long run. Since REDD programs would demand 
protection of forests, “these initiatives may affect the property rights of indigenous peoples, who 
may find that access or use has been restricted or curtailed altogether on lands used for these 
projects”.183 Thus, REDD programs ought to consider indigenous peoples’ rights such as sharing 
in the financial benefits of REDD, the rights to participate in decision-making around REDD 
schemes, and the rights to have their knowledge about forestry resources respected.184 I 
understand that this will not be simple or cheap, as the transaction costs of negotiating with each 
indigenous community are significant.  
 Notwithstanding the above, carbon offsetting is not a panacea. There are some significant 
difficulties related to valorizing and compensating ecosystem services as complex as carbon 
sequestration. First of all, no one can assure that the trees will stand forever. Sooner or later they 
will be cut down for agricultural uses, or will be lost to fire, pests or other disruptions.185 The 
forest mass cannot be permanently guaranteed. The point is that even though carbon 
sequestration through avoided deforestation may have temporary benefits, as well as act as a 
bridge to clean energy,186 carbon offsetting would not provide a permanent solution. 
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 Second, this model has a risk of creating a “leakage effect”, that is to say, restoring a forest 
in one place would lead someone else to deforest elsewhere due to market pressures. Moreover, 
the government may preserve one forest from planned logging and instead offer timber 
concessions elsewhere.187 In addition, logging companies put out of business in one country may 
instead cut timber in a neighboring country.188 
 Third, monitoring and certification costs can be considerably expensive. They not only 
require putting in place surveillance technology, but also calculating carbon absorption over 
time, which poses serious technical challenges, particularly under different climate change 
scenarios.189 
 Fourth, this scheme requires allocating potential carbon credits. In Ecuador, this is 
troublesome as it is not yet clear who will be entitled to carbon credits vis-à-vis the conflicting 
rights between indigenous peoples and the government. As mentioned before (supra Section I.1), 
the Yasuni National Park partially overlaps indigenous peoples’ territories that are actually in 
possession of areas of the forest. Hence allocation of potential carbon credits is troublesome. 
 Finally, and most importantly, this model relies on the actions of the government. As in the 
Yasuni-ITT Initiative, there is a latent and unavoidable risk that the government could decide in 
the future to use the lands to increase its agricultural frontier. When political actors control the 
solution, there is an enormous risk of a deviation in the objectives. 
 Although the valorization of ecosystem services is not a bad idea, I will explore a final 
alternative, namely, the establishment of a conservation easement over the Yasuni National Park.    
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(c)  Establishing a conservation easement 
 Conservation easements present a powerful alternative to traditional command-and-control 
approaches, as broad prohibitions to clear forest lands have proven to be ineffective methods to 
deter deforestation in the Amazon.190 Through the conveyance of conservation easements, 
landowners would receive enough economic incentives to preserve natural forests instead of 
clearing them.  
 In the United States, conservation easements are the fastest-growing method for protecting 
land and attaining land protection goals,191 even though they are not exempted from criticism.192 
A conservation easement is 
a non-possessory interest in a parcel of land created by deeds executed with the same formalities 
associated with real estate conveyances. . . . [It is a] non-regulatory, voluntary conservation tool. 
Essentially. . . . rights typically removed from the land by a conservation easement include 
development and mining. Those that remain with the land are generally those seen as nondestructive 
and otherwise conductive to the protection of the resource itself (emphasis added).193 
 
[It imposes] limitations or affirmative obligations the purposes of which include retaining or 
protecting natural, scenic, or open-space values of real property, assuring its availability for 
agricultural, forest, recreational, or open-space use, protecting natural resources, maintaining or 
enhancing air or water quality, or preserving historical, architectural, archaeological, or cultural 
aspects of real property.194    
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Generally speaking, conservation easements are a mixture of different legal concepts: they 
have some attributes of contracts, some of real property easements, and some of charitable 
trusts.195 In the United States conservation easements are mainly statutory creatures.196 Although 
conservation easements vary between states, they are generally characterized by the following 
features:197 (i) They grant a right or interest in real property, in the form of a restriction, 
easement, covenant, or condition to protect natural or scenic value; promote forest, recreational 
or agricultural use; enhance air or water quality; preserve historical or archaeological features; 
protect habitat or biodiversity. (ii) The landowner is not deprived of possession, but the easement 
implies a collection of restrictions and affirmative obligations, limiting the exercise of certain 
ownership rights according to the preservation objectives. (iii) They can be conveyed for a fixed 
term or perpetuity, and they bind present and future owners of the property with regard to the 
restricted activity.198 (iv) They can be recorded in the Public Registry and be enforced in courts, 
though arbitration is the common option of the parties. (v) They are subject to certain tax 
benefits.199 
 Having written the above, I propose conveying a conservation easement over the surface 
lands comprised by the ITT reserves within the Yasuni National Park, which are both public and 
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communal lands. The natural candidates for conservation market-makers are environmental 
NGOs like The Nature Conservancy,200 which may offer payments to Ecuador and/or to the 
indigenous peoples for conservation easements, that is, by entering into a contract whereby they 
compromise to preserve the forest. In addition to NGOs, global affluent citizens can contribute to 
the financing of conservation easements. Of course, establishing a conservation easement will 
not be feasible until conflicting interests around the Yasuni National Park are settled. This 
demands that boundaries are clearly defined and surface lands titled and recorded (see supra (b)). 
 In my opinion, a conservation easement approach is an ideal tool that focuses on the trees 
and not on the oil reserves. First, conservation easements are well-defined (the limitations on the 
rights of the landowner are clearly established on a contract which is recordable in the public 
registry, bind present and future owners, and can even be fixed for perpetuity); enforceable (the 
rights of both parties can be enforced by courts or arbitration tribunal); and tradable property 
rights (the contractual rights can be transferred freely to other parties, without affecting the main 
conservation obligations stipulated in the contract). These “modernist” features−which are latent 
in conservation easements−will guarantee long-term conservation results, by contrast to the 
uncertainty engendered by Correa’s proposal.  
 Second, provided the economic incentives are well placed, conservation easements can be 
sufficiently lucrative to the government of Ecuador for it to respect its contractual obligations to 
protect the forests. In other words, if preserving the forest is sufficiently profitable, there are 
enough reasons why Ecuador can forgo its right to exploit the ITT oil reserves. Moreover, 
                                                            




nothing impedes combining a conservation easement with carbon offsetting measures.201 Simply 
put, it is possible to include carbon emission rights for avoided GHG emissions in conservation 
easement schemes, thus increasing the revenues for the surface land owners.  
 Third, a conservation easement will not affect indigenous peoples’ possession of the lands, 
in contrast to Correa’s proposal. Notice, however, that establishing a conservation easement does 
require the cooperation of indigenous peoples to fulfill the conservation objectives in a 
comprehensive manner (see supra (b)).202 
 To sum up, conservation easements are well-suited property-based instruments to 
materialize the cosmopolitan values. Such measures demand the voluntary and personal 
contributions of all capable citizens to help abate climate change. In other words, conservation 
easements may serve as an instrument for cosmopolitan climate justice. 
 
Conclusion 
 Climate change affects all human beings regardless of where they live and what citizenship 
they hold. Immediate and effective global measures are required to solve this global “tragedy of 
the commons”. From a cosmopolitan justice approach, I have shown that each individual has the 
moral duty toward all human beings to help abate global warming by reducing their GHG 
emissions, engaging in carbon-offsetting voluntary programs, and thus mitigating the 
excruciating and transnational effects of climate change. 
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 Notwithstanding my critique, one virtue of the Yasuni-ITT Initiative is that it represents a 
call from the developing world to the developed world for the immediate adoption of globally 
effective measures within the UNFCCC fora, such as the adoption of REDD or similar programs, 
amid this period of diplomatic procrastination. The Amazonian countries desperately claim for 
the valorization of the ecosystem services that their forests provide to the world for free. It is 
about time the global citizens stop free riding and begin to pay for the carbon absorption and 
climate regulation services provided by the largest rainforest on Earth, an essential facet in the 
existence of human kind.  
